

Committee Statement

Committee Statement: References are updated in accordance with the Reference policy. **Response Message:** FR-2-NFPA 730-2024

Public Input No. 17-NFPA 730-2023 [Section No. 2.3.2]


| First Rev | vision No. 3-NFPA 730-2024 [Section No. 2.4] |
|-----------------------------|---|
| 2.4 Refe | erences for Extracts in Advisory Sections. |
| NFPA 72 | [®] , National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code [®] , $\frac{2022}{2025}$ 2025 edition. |
| <u>NFPA 99</u> | , <u>Health Care Facilities Code, 2024</u> edition. |
| NFPA 73 | 1, Standard for the Installation of Premises Security Systems, 2023 2026 edition. |
| NFPA 50 | 900 [®] Building Construction and Safety Code [®] - 2021 edition. |
| ubmitter Info Committee: | PMM-AAA |
| Submittal Da | ate: Tue May 21 16:37:45 EDT 2024 |
| ommittee St | atement |
| Committee Statement: | This revision updates extracted text in accordance with the Extract Policy. For substantiation on any changes, see the first and second draft reports for the source document. The extract is changed from NFPA 5000 to NFPA 99 to reference the base document as NFPA 5000 extracts the requirements from NFPA 99. |
| Response Message: | FR-3-NFPA 730-2024 |


| 3.3.14.2* | Health Care Facilities. |
|--|--|
| | , portions of buildings, or mobile enclosures in which <u>human</u> medical, dental, ic, nursing, obstetrical, or surgical care is provided. [5000 <u>99</u> , 2021 <u>2024</u>] |
| A.3.3.1 | 4.2 Health Care Facilities. |
| facilities permane pertain t type of c <i>facility</i> s occupar however facilities | are facilities include, but are not limited to, hospitals, nursing homes, limited care , clinics, medical and dental offices, and ambulatory health care centers, whether ent or movable. This definition applies to normal, regular operations and does not o facilities during declared local or national disasters. A health care facility is not a occupancy classification as defined by NFPA 101. Therefore, the term <i>health care</i> hould not be confused with the term <i>health care occupancy</i> . All health care icies (and ambulatory health care occupancies) are considered health care facilities; , not all health care facilities are considered health care occupancies, as health care also include ambulatory health care occupancies and business occupancies. 2,2021 2024] |
| bmitter Info | ormation Verification |
| Committee: Submittal Da | PMM-AAA Ite: Tue May 21 17:04:01 EDT 2024 |
| | atement |
| mmittee St | |
| Committee St Statement: | This revision updates extracted text in accordance with the Extract Policy. For substantiation on any changes, see the first and second draft reports for the source document. The extract is changed from NFPA 5000 to NFPA 99 to reference the bas document as NFPA 5000 extracts this definition from NFPA 99. |

| A fa | 30 * Monitoring Station. cility that receives signals from electronic- premises security systems and has personnel i ndance at all times to respond to these signals. [731 , 2023 <u>2026</u>] |
|------------------|--|
| A .3 | 3.3.30 Monitoring Station. |
| Ser | vices offered by a monitoring station can include the following: |
| (1) | System installation |
| (2) | Alarm, guard, and supervisory signal monitoring |
| (3) | Retransmission |
| (4) | Testing and maintenance |
| (5) | Alarm response service |
| (6) | Record keeping and reporting |
| ` ' | Video monitoring |
| (8) | Audio monitoring |
| [73 ⁻ | 1, 2023 |

| Committee Statement: | This revision updates extracted text in accordance with the Extract Policy. For substantiation on any changes, see the first and second draft reports for the source document. |
|-------------------------|--|
| Response Message: | FR-5-NFPA 730-2024 |

| 3.3.34 * R | eader. |
|---|---|
| readable (| <u>used in physical security systems to read a credential</u> that allows a machine predential to be entered into an access control system <u>access through access control</u> 31, 2023 2026] |
| A.3.3.34 | Reader. |
| Reauers | CALLINE OF THATY WORS AND ALE THEOLED TO THEOLOP CALLADS ELECTIONIC KEV |
| | can be of many types and are intended to include car tags, electronic key, stripe, proximity badge, biometric, or other identifier. [731 , 2023 <u>2026</u>] rmation Verification |
| | stripe, proximity badge, biometric, or other identifier. [731 , 2023 <u>2026</u>] |
| bmitter Info Committee: | stripe, proximity badge, biometric, or other identifier. [731 , 2023 <u>2026</u>] |
| bmitter Info Committee: | stripe, proximity badge, biometric, or other identifier. [731 , 2023 <u>2026</u>] rmation Verification PMM-AAA re: Tue May 21 17:08:20 EDT 2024 |
| bmitter Info Committee: Submittal Dat | stripe, proximity badge, biometric, or other identifier. [731 , 2023 <u>2026</u>] rmation Verification PMM-AAA re: Tue May 21 17:08:20 EDT 2024 |





12.1.3.2

The duties of the responsible person(s) should include but not be limited to the following:

- (1) Providing identification, as shown by review of the SVA, for patients, staff, and other people entering the facility
- (2) Controlling access into and out of security-sensitive areas as identified in the SVA
- (3) Defining and implementing procedures for the following situations:
 - (a) Security incident
 - (b) Hostage situation
 - (c)* Bomb
 - (d) Criminal threat
 - (e) Labor action
 - (f) Disorderly conduct
 - (g) Workplace violence
 - (h) Restraining orders
 - (i) Infant or pediatric abduction
 - (j) Situations involving VIPs or the media
 - (k) Ensuring access to emergency areas
 - (I) * Active shooter(s)

A.12.1.3.2(3)(I)

See NFPA 3000 for additional information on active shooter planning and response.

- (4) Providing security at alternative care sites or vacated facilities
- (5) Controlling vehicular traffic control on the facility property
- (6) Protecting the facility assets, including property and equipment
- (7) Establishing a policy for interaction with law enforcement agencies
- (8) Ensuring compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and standards regarding security management operations
- (9) Putting into place education and training of the facility security force to address the following:
 - (a) Customer service
 - (b) Use of physical restraints
 - (c) Use of force
 - (d) Response criteria
 - (e) Fire watch procedures
 - (f) Lockdown procedures
 - (g) Emergency notification procedures


Supplemental Information


File Name

Description

Approved


| 730_Chapter_ | 12_12_1_3_2_FR-22.docx | 730_Chapter_12_12_1_3_2_FR-22 |
|--|--|---|
| Submitter Infor | mation Verification | |
| Committee: Submittal Date Committee Stat | PMM-AAA : Thu May 23 16:57:34 EDT :ement | 2024 |
| Committee Statement: Response | | e user additional resource of information regarding the active shooter or hostile incident. |
| Message: | | |





An effective countermeasure is one that drives improvements in mitigating the defined threats and results in a reduction in the security risk level. With respect to the development of security countermeasures, and in consideration of the defined threats, the SVA team's efforts to strengthen the security layers of protection begins with a focus on the concentric circles of protection design methodology, shown in Figure A.5.2.3(5).

Figure A.5.2.3(5) Concentric Circles of Protection. (Source: SafePlace Corporation.)



This methodology provides for protection of defined critical assets by considering the four primary protection elements. The primary elements of an effective protection plan design are as follows:

- (1) Deter discouraging an adversary from attempting an assault by reducing the likelihood of a successful attack.
- (2) Detect determining that an undesirable event has occurred or is occurring. Detection includes sensing the event, communicating the alarm to an attended location, and assessing the alarm.
- (3) Delay impeding adversary penetration into a protected area.
- (4) Respond counteracting adversary activity and interrupting the undesirable event.

Theft, sabotage, or other malevolent acts can be prevented in two ways, by either deterring the adversary or defeating the adversary. In the development of security countermeasures, it is important to understand that a properly designed and implemented security program integrates people, procedures, and technologies for the protection of assets. The use of technologies alone is not the solution.

In developing effective countermeasures, it is important to remember that highly probable threats may not require countermeasures attention if the net loss they would produce is small. But moderately probable risks require attention if the magnitude of the loss they produce is great. The correlative of probability of occurrence is severity or criticality of occurrence. Assessing the criticality of a loss is imperative for a meaningful vulnerability assessment. Criticality is first considered on a single event or occurrence basis. For events with established frequency or high recurrence probability, criticality must be considered cumulatively.

To determine the severity or consequence of a loss, all costs associated with each loss must be considered. Kinds of loss to be considered include but are not limited to the following:

(1) *Permanent replacement.* Permanent replacement of a lost asset includes all of the cost to return it to its former location. Components of that cost are as follows:

- (a) Purchase price or manufacturing cost
- (b) Freight and shipping charges
- (c) Make-ready or preparation cost to install it or make it functional
- (2) *Temporary substitute*. In regard to tools of production and other items making up the active structure of an enterprise, it may be necessary to procure substitutes while awaiting permanent replacements. Components of temporary substitute costs may be as follows:
 - (a) Lease or rental
 - (b) Premium labor, such as overtime or extra shift work to compensate for the missing production
- (3) *Related or consequent cost.* If other personnel or equipment are idle or underutilized because of the absence of an asset lost through a security incident, the cost of the down time is also attributable to the loss event.
- (4) Lost income cost. If cash that might otherwise be invested is used to procure permanent replacements or temporary substitutes or to pay consequence costs, the income that might have been realized from the investment must also be considered as part of the loss.
- (5) Cost abatement. To the extent it is available, insurance, or other indemnification for the loss should be subtracted from the costs enumerated above. For precision, that portion of the insurance premium cost attributable to the lost asset should be subtracted from the available insurance before the insurance is used to offset the loss.

The "new world" we live in poses a new challenge: the increased presence and threat of adversarial attack. Our journey now involves an important dual approach, the combination of today's security methodologies with traditional safety and risk management practices to strengthen security layers of protection.

An effective security program, resulting from the completion and implementation of a comprehensive SVA, provides <u>intends to provide</u> measurable benefits in the workplace for personnel (staff, guests, and visitors), in the protection of property, and in operations, resulting in enhanced business performance.

Submitter Information Verification

Committee: PMM-AAA Submittal Date: Thu May 23 13:41:51 EDT 2024


Committee Statement

Committee Statement: The figure is provided as guidance and information, it doesn't deter from the users understanding of the mandatory section. The annex material is revised to remove unnecessarily opinionated text. The SVA provides details on the vulnerabilities, and the intent is to provide benefits to the workplace personnel.

Response FR-9-NFPA 730-2024

Message:

Public Input No. 10-NFPA 730-2023 [Section No. A.5.2.3(5)]



| A.11.1.3.2 | ?(7)(e) 🔗 |
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| students a | se in active shooter incidents, many schools have instituted protocols to protect the nd faculty from both internal and external threats. The security plan should detail plement such protocols in a way that is both practical and practicable. |
| against en access to Hallways, students, f | nool lockdowns, all exterior doors and windows are locked or otherwise secured try, lights are turned off, and blinds (where provided) are closed to restrict visual the interior. Occupants should stay low and away from windows and doors. bathrooms, and any areas that cannot be secured should be cleared. Take all faculty, and visitors/vendors into account. Remain in place until an all clear from personnel is given. |
| administra | nool lockouts, all exterior doors are locked and the main entrance is monitored by an tor, administrator designee, security officer, or school resource officer. This allows the school to continue with normal inside activity but restricts outside activity |
| | place is the use of a structure and its indoor atmosphere to temporarily separate from a hazardous outdoor environment. |
| particularly during a lo counselors groups an | needs to be minimized when any of these protocols are implemented. Schools, / large campuses, have many groups of people who might need to have access ockdown, such as campus police, local police, fire, ambulance, management, s, emergency responders, and senior administrators. It is important that these d their means of access be described and documented, since several departments esponsible for the protocols. |
| | A 428 <u>/BIPS-07</u> , <i>Primer for to Design Safe Schools Projects in Case of Terrorist I<u>d School Shootings ,</u> for material on shelter-in-place.</i> |
| See NFPA | A 3000 for additional information on active shooter planning and response. |
| ubmitter Info | rmation Verification |
| Committee: | PMM-AAA |
| Submittal Dat | e: Thu May 23 16:54:55 EDT 2024 |
| ommittee Sta | itement |
| | This revision provides the user additional resource of information regarding the |

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| First Revi | ision No. 10-NFPA 730-2024 [Section No. A.20.3.2] |
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| A.20.3.2 | Ø |
| Spaces <u>Cir</u> guideline is law enforce legal profes covers bas protocol for survey and practices for to exterior through ad | <u>1-22</u> , <u>Guideline Guide</u> for Security Lighting for People, Property, and Public <u>ritcal Infrastructure</u> , is for design and implementation of security lighting. The s intended for use by property owners and managers, crime prevention specialists, ement and security professionals, risk managers, lighting specifiers, contractors, the ssion, and homeowners concerned about security and the prevention of crime. It sic security principles, illumination requirements for various types of properties, r evaluating current lighting levels for different security applications, and security d crime search methodology. Guidelines include exterior and interior security lighting or the reasonable protection of persons and property. There are many complexities lighting design, including but not limited to "dark sky" compliance, light wash jacent properties, and energy conservation. Proper illumination should encourage users to occupy spaces and discourage intruders. |
| Submitter Infor | rmation Verification |
| Committee: | PMM-AAA |
| Submittal Date | e: Thu May 23 14:19:49 EDT 2024 |
| Committee Stat | tement |
| Committee Statement: | The title of IES G-1 has been updated since the original 2003 submission referred to in this standard. The revision reflects the updated naming for the version year 2022. |
| _ | FR-10-NFPA 730-2024 |
| Response Message: | FR-10-INFFA / 30-2024 |

First Revision No. 11-NFPA 730-2024 [Section No. E.4.2.1]

E.4.2.1

As a result of increased security awareness, there has been a move away from the traditional key and lock systems to more sophisticated access control systems. The technology used in access control systems ranges from simple push-button locks to computerized access control systems integrated with video surveillance systems. Regardless of the technology used, all access control systems have one primary objective — to screen or identify people prior to allowing entry. Since identification is the foundation of all access control systems, they generally require that the user be in possession of a machine readable credential. Establishing a person's identity can be based on three methods: something known by a person (e.g., password), something possessed by a person (e.g., card or key), or something physically unique about the person (e.g., fingerprint). Electronic access control equipment should be listed to UL 294, Access Control System Units.

Submitter Information Verification

Committee: PMM-AAA Submittal Date: Thu May 23 14:23:42 EDT 2024

Committee Statement

Committee
Statement:The revision adds text that was taken from E.4.2.3.2 Biometric Systems, which
provided better clarification for the methods of verifying identity than the existing text.
The means for establishing identity were relevant to the whole section of 4.2.3, and
therefore was better placed before it than recessed within a sub-section of it.Response
Message:FR-11-NFPA 730-2024

Public Input No. 16-NFPA 730-2023 [Section No. E.4.2.1]

First Revision No. 12-NFPA 730-2024 [Section No. E.4.2.3.2 [Excluding any NFPA Sub-Sections]]

Establishing a person's identity can be based on three methods: something known by a person (a password), something possessed by a person (a card or key), and something physical about a person (a personal characteristic). Biometric access control devices, or personal characteristic verification locks, rely on the third method. Since duplication of individual physical characteristics is very rare, biometric devices, in theory, could offer the highest security possible. Biometric systems measure a unique characteristic of the person seeking access. These systems are classified as fingerprint, hand or palm geometry, handwriting, voice, and retinal verification systems. Typically, biometric readers are connected to a CPU but can also be used alone. The most readily available commercial systems for access control are fingerprint, palm, iris, and facial systems. Additionally, legacy retina, handwriting, and voice systems may exist but have been deprecated and should not be considered for new access control purposes.

Submitter Information Verification

Committee: PMM-AAA Submittal Date: Thu May 23 14:31:12 EDT 2024

Committee Statement

CommitteeThe opening section on means of establishing identity was relocated to E.4.2.1. ThisStatement:revision provides updated recommendations based on current industry technology.ResponseFR-12-NFPA 730-2024

Public Input No. 4-NFPA 730-2023 [Section No. E.4.2.3.2 [Excluding any Sub-Sections]]

| First Rev | vision No. 13-NFPA 730-2024 [Section No. E.4.2.3.2.1 [Excluding any |
|-------------------------|--|
| Sub-Sections | 11 |
| | |
| | nt verification systems have been around for more than a decade. These systems person by matching stored fingerprints with live prints presented on an electro-optical |
| Submitter Info | ormation Verification |
| Committee: | PMM-AAA |
| Submittal Da | te: Thu May 23 14:35:59 EDT 2024 |
| Committee Sta | atement |
| Committee Statement: | The length of time that optical finger print scanners have been available is well in excess of 10 years; updating the length of time they have been available does not further the explanation of what they are. The language has been updated to simplify the text and provide only the relevant information. |
| Response Message: | FR-13-NFPA 730-2024 |
| Public Input N | No. 15-NFPA 730-2023 [Section No. E.4.2.3.2.1 [Excluding any Sub-Sections]] |

| First Rev | First Revision No. 17-NFPA 730-2024 [New Section after E.4.2.3.2.5] | | |
|-----------------------------|--|--|--|
| Iris verific identifying | 2.6 Iris Verification Systems. Exation systems use the unique pattern within the iris of the eye as a means of g a person. The user looks into an eyepiece that images the iris. The image is | | |
| Submitter Info | d to information stored in a computer. | | |
| | PMM-AAA ate: Thu May 23 15:21:08 EDT 2024 | | |
| Committee St | atement | | |
| Committee Statement: | Retinal scanners currently exist in some legacy government systems, but are not commercially available for new installation. Iris verification is a newer technology than retinal verification systems. A task group is established to review iris verification technology and provide recommendations for the Second Draft Meeting. | | |
| Response Message: | FR-17-NFPA 730-2024 | | |


| 🙀 First Rev | vision No. 16-NFPA 730-2024 [Section No. E.4.2.3.2.5] |
|--|---|
| F 4 2 3 2 | .5 Retinal Verification Systems. |
| Retinal ve is unique scans the converted in retinal illness, al device. <u>R</u> | erification systems use the pattern of blood vessels within the retina of the eye, which in everyone, as a means of identifying a person. The user looks into an eyepiece that e retina with a safe low-level infrared light. The infrared light reflected back is d into digital data that is compared to information stored in a computer. The limitation verification systems is that retinal patterns are not stable and can be altered by injury, cohol, or drugs. There also may be resistance on the part of a person to look into the <u>etinal scanners for access control have largely been deprecated and are no longer</u> <u>ommercially available.</u> |
| Submitter Info | ormation Verification |
| Committee: | PMM-AAA |
| Submittal Da | ate: Thu May 23 15:17:44 EDT 2024 |
| committee St | atement |
| Committee Statement: | Retinal scanners currently exist in some legacy government systems, but are not commercially available for new installation. The revision acknowledges that such systems may still exist somewhere, but updates the standard to not mislead that such technology is still a viable option for current access control systems. |
| Response Message: | FR-16-NFPA 730-2024 |
| Public Input | No. 5-NFPA 730-2023 [Section No. E.4.2.3.2.5] |

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| First Rev | ision No. 15-NFPA 730-2024 [Section No. E.4.3.1.2] |
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| E.4.3.1.2 | |
| rectangles windows c When the contrast is | enerator attached to the monitor can be adjusted to project a pattern of light or dark , or windows, which can be adjusted in size and location on the screen. The an be focused on a fixed object to be protected, such as a safe or a doorknob. mage of an intruder or moving object enters the monitored window, the difference in detected and triggers an alarm. <u>Such technology is largely deprecated and not</u> to contemporary installations. |
| Submitter Info | rmation Verification |
| Committee: | PMM-AAA |
| Submittal Dat | e: Thu May 23 15:07:56 EDT 2024 |
| committee Sta | tement |
| Committee Statement: Response Message: | Signal generator technology may not be applicable to contemporary installations, however, it may still be in use and the information provided is useful to the user. FR-15-NFPA 730-2024 |

| First Re | evision No. 18-NFPA 730-2024 [Section No. E.4.3.2.1] |
|---|--|
| E.4.3.2 | 1 Equipment. |
| the man package purpose <u>Act (ND</u> | arveillance equipment should provide appropriate resolution equal to or greater than ufacturer's resolution specified in a marking on the equipment or in the literature and with the video equipment. Video surveillance equipment should be listed for its and comply with Section 889 of the John S . McCain National Defense Authorization AA) for Year 2019, which prohibits the purchase of covered telecommunications and services from vendors who sell products containing spyware. |
| bmitter Inf | ormation Verification |
| Committee: Submittal D | PMM-AAA Pate: Thu May 23 15:33:01 EDT 2024 |
| Committee | PMM-AAA Pate: Thu May 23 15:33:01 EDT 2024 |
| Committee: Submittal D | PMM-AAA Pate: Thu May 23 15:33:01 EDT 2024 tatement This revision removes language that is unclear and appears to attempt to state that |

| First Revision No. 19-NFPA 730-2024 [Section No. E.4.3.2.2.4] | | | | |
|---|---|--|--|--|
| E.4.3.2.2 | .4 | | | |
| Many rec coverage | The signal can be recorded by a video recorder for playback and analysis at a later time. Many recorders have a time-lapse mode for quick playback of lengthy periods of tape coverage. This system is often used in conjunction with a date-time generator that can project a continuous image of the date and time in the corner of the monitor screen. | | | |
| ubmitter Info | ormation Verification | | | |
| | PMM-AAA Ite: Thu May 23 15:38:54 EDT 2024 | | | |
| ommittee St | atement | | | |
| Committee Statement: | This revision removed text that referenced deprecated information on the use of VCRs in conjunction with a matrix/controller for a VSS recording device. The languag was clarified to refer to recording without specifying the recording device. | | | |
| Response Message: | FR-19-NFPA 730-2024 | | | |
| | No. 14-NFPA 730-2023 [Section No. E.4.3.2.2.4] | | | |



G.1.2.2 BHMA Publications.

Builders Hardware Manufacturers Association, 355 Lexington Avenue, 15th Floor, New York, NY 10017.

ANSI/BHMA A156.1, Butts and Hinges, 2016 2021.

ANSI/BHMA A156.2, Bored and Preassembled Locks and Latches, 2017 2022.

ANSI/BHMA A156.4, Door Controls — Closers Closers, 2019.

ANSI/BHMA A156.5, *Auxiliary Locks and Associated Products Cylinders and Input Devices for Locks*, 2020.

ANSI/BHMA A156.12, Interconnected Locks and Latches, 2018 2022.

ANSI/BHMA A156.13, Mortise Locks and Latches Series 1000, 2017 2022.

ANSI/BHMA A156.16, Auxiliary Hardware, 2018 2023.

ANSI/BHMA A156.17, Self-Closing Hinges and Pivots, 2019.

ANSI/BHMA A156.23, *Electromagnetic Locks*, 2017.

ANSI/BHMA A156.24, Delayed Egress Locking Systems, 2018 2022.

ANSI/BHMA A156.25, Electrified Locking Devices, 2018 2021.

ANSI/BHMA A156.26, Continuous Hinges, 2017.

ANSI/BHMA A156.28, Recommended Practice for Master Keying Systems, 2018 2023.

ANSI/BHMA A156.30, *High Security Cylinders*, 2020.

ANSI/BHMA A156.31, Electric Strikes and Frame Mounted Actuators, 2019.

G.1.2.3 FEMA Publications.

Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. US Department of Homeland Security, 500 C Street, SW, Washington, DC 20472 20024.

FEMA 428/<u>BIPS-07</u>, Primer for to Design Safe Schools Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks and School Shootings, December 2003 January 2012.

G.1.2.4 IEEE Publications.

IEEE, 3 Park Avenue, 17th Floor, New York, NY 10016-5997 Operations Center, 445 Hoes Lane, Piscataway, NJ 08854-4141.

ANSI/IEEE C2-2023, National Electrical Safety Code, 2012, with 2013 interpretation 2022.

G.1.2.5 IESNA Publications.

Illuminating Engineering Society, 120 Wall Street, Floor 17, New York, NY 10005-4001.

IES <u>G 1</u> <u>G-1-22</u>, <u>Guideline Guide</u> for Security Lighting for People, Property, and Public Spaces <u>Critical Infrastructure</u>, 2003 2022.

G.1.2.6 SDI Publications.

Steel Door Institute, managed by Wherry Associates, 30200 Detroit Road, Cleveland, OH 44145-1967.

ANSI/SDI A250.4, Test Procedure and Acceptance Criteria for Physical Endurance for Steel Doors, <u>Frames</u> and Hardware Reinforcing <u>Frame Anchors</u>, 2011 2022.

ANSI/SDI A250.8, *Recommended*-Specifications for Standard Steel Door <u>Doors &</u> Frames, 2003, reaffirmed 2008 <u>2017</u>.

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Submittal Date: Tue May 21 17:12:56 EDT 2024

Committee Statement

| Committee Statement: | References updated in accordance with the Reference policy. The reference to NFPA 3000 is added based its addition to Annex A. | |
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| Response Message: | FR-7-NFPA 730-2024 | |
| Public Input No. 2 | 20-NFPA 730-2023 [Section No. G.1.2.7] | |
| Public Input No. | Public Input No. 3-NFPA 730-2023 [Section No. G.1.2.5] | |

| First Rev | First Revision No. 8-NFPA 730-2024 [Section No. G.3] | | | | |
|-------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|
| G.3 Refe | G.3 References for Extracts in Informational Sections. | | | | |
| NFPA 731 | PA 731, Standard for the Installation of Premises Security Systems, 2023 2026 edition. | | | | |
| <u>NFPA 99,</u> | A 99, <u>Health Care Facilities Code</u> , 2024 edition. | | | | |
| NFPA 50 | <i>00</i> [⊕] , <i>Building Construction and Safety Code</i> [⊕] , 2021 edition. | | | | |
| Submitter Info | Submitter Information Verification | | | | |
| Committee: | PMM-AAA | | | | |
| Submittal Da | te: Tue May 21 17:28:55 EDT 2024 | | | | |
| Committee Sta | atement | | | | |
| Committee Statement: | This revision updates extracted text in accordance with the Extract Policy. For substantiation on any changes, see the first and second draft reports for the source document. The extract from NFPA 5000 was changed to NFPA 99 as NFPA 5000 extracts from NFPA 99 for this content. | | | | |
| Response Message: | FR-8-NFPA 730-2024 | | | | |